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Power Allocation Games in Interference Relay Channels: Existence Analysis of Nash Equilibria


We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where the two transmitters can exploit one common relay node to improve their individual transmission rate. Communications are assumed to be multiband, and transmitters are assumed to selfishly allocate their resources to optimize their individual transmission rate. The main objective of this paper is to show that this conflicting situation (modeled by a non-cooperative game) has some stable outcomes, namely, Nash equilibria. This result is proved for three different types of relaying protocols: decode-and-forward, estimate-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. We provide additional results on the problems of uniqueness, efficiency of the equilibrium, and convergence of a best-response-based dynamics to the equilibrium. These issues are analyzed in a special case of the amplify-and-forward protocol and illustrated by simulations in general.

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Correspondence to Elena Veronica Belmega.

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Belmega, E.V., Djeumou, B. & Lasaulce, S. Power Allocation Games in Interference Relay Channels: Existence Analysis of Nash Equilibria. J Wireless Com Network 2010, 583462 (2010).

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  • Information System
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Nash
  • Transmission Rate
  • System Application