From: Tree Based Protocol for Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks
Schemes | Metrics | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
memory Complexity | communication Complexity | Key connectivity | Resilience against node capture | Scalability | |
Key Infection [6] | Depends on the number of one hop neighbors ( | For each node: 2 * d | 100% | Weak | Good |
BROSK [9] | 1 | 2 * d | 100% | Very weak | Very good |
Lightweight Key Management System [10] | 4+2 g, where g is number of group in network | 2 * d | 100% | Very weak | Very good |
Blom Scheme [7] | 2(λ + 1) | d + 1 | 100% | λ- secure | Medium |
Polynomial scheme [8] | λ +1 | d + 1 | 100% | λ- secure | Very good |
SPINS [11] | 5 + the chain list of keys used by μ TESLA | 3*( | 100% | Weak | Medium |
Random key predistribution [14] | Key pool size (m) + keys identifier s | d + 1 |
Probability that two nodes share a key, say
| Depends on | Good |
Q-composite [15] | 2 * m | d + 1 |
Probability that two nodes share a key, say
| Depends on | Medium |
Key management using deployment knowledge [16] | d | d+ 1 |
Probability that two nodes share a key, say
| Depends on | Good |
Dynamic key management [17] | k keys + keys' identifiers | d + 1 |
Probability that two nodes share a key, say
| Depends on | Good |
LEAP [12] | (3 * d) + 2 + keys chain of μ TESLA | (2 * d) + 1 | 100% | Very good | Good |
Location-based keys [13] | 2 *d + 1 | 2 * d |
Probability that two nodes share a key, say
| λ-secure | Good |
Our solution | 3 + number of sons | d + 1 | 100% | Good | Good |