From: A survey of local/cooperative-based malicious information detection techniques in VANETs
MDS | Type | Drawback | Privacy | Delay | Overhead | (FP) Rate | Applications | Â | Â |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Database rules [58] | Plausibility | This model allows passing fake sign messages from database rules. | No | High | High | Min | CRN | Â | Â |
Multiple parameters [59] | Plausibility | False position in past checking might create false positive | No | High | Low | Max | Position data | Â | Â |
Classifier framework [60] | Plausibility | Uses multiple classifier for detection | No | High | High | Min | Speed & Position | Â | Â |
RSU-based detection [15] | Plausibility | Vehicles will be waiting for position validation from RSUs | No | High | Low | Min | Position data | Â | Â |
ELIDV [61] | Plausibility | Performance decreases when malicious nodes increase in VANETs | No | High | Low | Min | EEBL, PCN, CRN | Â | Â |
Data centric (DC) [7] | Consistency | Sometimes, this scheme cannot provide useful information for detection | Yes | Low | Low | No | EEBL, PCN, CRN | Â | Â |
HBBD [62] | Consistency | Beacon messages lose due to weak signal. | Yes | Low | Low | Min | Position & speed | Â | Â |
TBD [63] | Behaviour | Assumed true location information for trajectory. | No | Low | Low | Max | PCN | Â | Â |
RCBD [64] | Behaviour | Assumed position information is correct | No | High | High | Min | PCN | Â | Â |