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Table 1 Relationship between countermeasure and possible threats for the OBU

From: CARAMEL: results on a secure architecture for connected and autonomous vehicles detecting GPS spoofing attacks

Countermeasure layers

Threats

Enclosure manipulation

ITS interface tamper attacks

V2X HSM interface tamper attacks

GNSS interface tamper attacks

Eavesdropping data signals

Clock fault injection

Temperature fault injection

Voltage fault injection

Environmental sensors

     

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

Opening enclosure detection

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

   

Coating covering sensible circuits, with self-destructive components to avoid coating removal

     

\(\bullet\)

  

Active wire-mesh protection for critical elements and signals

 

\(\bullet\)

 

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

  

Mutual authentication

 

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

     

Data encryption

  

\(\bullet\)

 

\(\bullet\)

   

Secure boot

 

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)

     

Application processor trusted execution environment

 

\(\bullet\)

\(\bullet\)