Open Access

Structural analysis of packing schemes for extracting hidden codes in mobile malware

EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking20162016:221

Received: 2 April 2016

Accepted: 6 September 2016

Published: 15 September 2016


In the Internet of Things service environment where all things are connected, mobile devices will become an extremely important medium linking together things with built-in heterogeneous communication functions. If a mobile device is exposed to hacking in this context, a security threat arises where all things linked to the device become targets of cyber hacking; therefore, greater emphasis will be placed on the demand for swift mobile malware detection and countermeasures. Such mobile malware applies advanced code-hiding schemes to ensure that the part of the code that executes malicious behavior is not detected by an anti-virus software. In order to detect mobile malware, we must first conduct structural analysis of their code-hiding schemes.

In this paper, we analyze the structure of the two representative Android-based code-hiding tools, Bangcle and DexProtector, and then introduce a method and procedure for extracting the hidden original code. We also present experimental results of applying these tools on sample malicious codes.


Repackaging attack Android app security Mobile code hiding

1 Introduction

In the present advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1] era, communication functions such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are embedded in all things, so that real-time connection between things is made possible. While connecting various IoT devices with a single communication standard is practically very difficult, individual users already own mobile devices that fuse together multiple communication modules and companies provide a bring your own device (BYOD) work environment; hence, mobile devices will play a key role in the proliferation of IoT services.

However, in the case of mobile devices, when this coupling medium for all things is exposed to hacking, there is the threat that all the connected things will also become targets for cyber hacking. If there is a cyber attack aimed at specific connected devices, the security vulnerability of mobile devices can bring about side effects that may even have a major adverse effect on a different industry [2]. For example, in smart car service, cars connected through a mobile device can become infected with a virus and, if an infected car has problems operating, studies show that, in the worst case, major car accidents could result [3]. Consequently, in the IoT, it is a task of utmost importance and urgency to ensure that mobile devices cannot be infected easily.

Unfortunately, the number of mobile malware codes is increasing each year with evolution into various types. Recently, there has even been an emergence of ransomware, where documents in an infected device are secretly encrypted to demand payment. The majority of the mobile malware targets the Android platform. Android malware can be generally divided into two camps: those that have been designed to impersonate a normal app and those that have been designed to hide their malicious behavior. In the case where malware is designed to impersonate a normal app, it impersonates apps that users most frequently use such as apps related to the smartphone theme, finance, and games, so that a similar app is designed to secretly execute malicious behavior such as account charging and game information extraction, without the user’s realization. To prevent an anti-virus from detecting such malware, attackers apply methods such as encryption, packing, and obfuscation [4] on the main code related to malicious behavior and then distribute it. To bring about speedy malware detection and response, understanding the structure of such code-hiding methods in order to extract the original code related to malicious behavior must first be achieved.

Thus, in this paper, we analyze the fundamentals behind the main code-hiding schemes used by mobile malware and, by running tests, empirically present methods for extracting the original code hidden in the malware through reverse engineering analysis. The tests target the malware that applies the main code-hiding tools, Bangcle [5] and DexProtector [6], and we analyze in detail the method of extracting the actual code responsible for malicious behavior from the packed Android application package (APK) files generated by these two analysis tools.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background knowledge. Sections 3 and 4 describe the process of extracting the original code by conducting reverse engineering analysis of the structures of Bangcle’s packing scheme and DexProtector’s class encryption scheme. Section 5 presents results from experiments using sample apps, and Section 6 draws conclusions.

2 Related works

2.1 Repackaging attacks

The cause of various problems, including malware distribution in the Android environment is as follows. The Android platform, also labeled the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) [7], promotes broad openness. While Androids possess a high market share for the smartphones because of this, various security problems have arisen owing to the app structure and signing method devised to provide this openness [8].

Android apps are, by default, built using the Java language and are generated in the APK file format [9, 10]. Because at this level in app development the developer distributes code by self-signing using jarsigner, an attacker can distribute code by re-signing using the attacker’s private key rather than the developer’s signature [11]. An attacker can use this point of weakness to insert attack code into a normal app, repackage it, and then distribute it. This is called a repackaging attack [12, 13].

2.2 Mobile code packing

Packing is a method used when one wishes to hide the code’s structure before the code is run. Code packed by techniques such as encryption and compression is not revealed until execution; then, at each run time, the packed code is unpacked through dynamic loading and executed. Code exposure is minimized through static analysis. Such packing methods are used mainly so that malware such as viruses or worms are not detected by an anti-virus; however, recently, normal programs have also utilized this method in the area of copyright protection to protect important code logic [14].

Generally, when using packing, the original code exists in its packed state, so a loader that unpacks packing code is added and the control flow is also adjusted so that the loader is run first. When a packed app is run, the loader is run first, so that the app loads once the packed code is unpacked before running the original code (Fig. 1). Such packing schemes have the advantage of minimizing modifications to the original code compared to a code obfuscation scheme.
Fig. 1

Packing and unpacking mechanisms

2.3 Mobile code reverse engineering

Reverse engineering methods for mobile code can be grouped roughly into static analysis methods or dynamic analysis methods. In static analysis, the method uses a disassembler or decompiler. Disassemblers targeting the Android execution file, called Dalvik Executable (DEX), include baksmali [15], dedexer [16], and apktoolkit [17], and using these programs, the DEX file is converted into a smali file [18], so that Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) bytecode [19] can be analyzed in units of commands. For decompilers, dex2jar [20], jad.jeb [21], etc. have been made public, and they also provide the function of restoring a DEX file into Java source code. Static analysis of the app is done through APK extraction using ADB, DEX conversion to JAR using dex2jar, and JAR file analysis using a Java decompiler while static analysis of so library is carried out using IDA [22] with Hex-Ray. We can investigate which functions and libraries are used through static analysis.

Dynamic analysis enables accurate observation of parameters and return values of variables and functions that are difficult to identify using static analysis, thus allowing effective analysis of the app. The main Android dynamic analysis tools are DroidScope [23], AppUse [24], and DroidBOX [25], but these run in sandbox-based emulator form. When an app is run in the emulator, it either analyzes the commands executed in the DVM or analyzes the APIs being used and provides the user with activity information needed for app analysis. Furthermore, IDA and GDB [26] are used not only for static analysis but also frequently for dynamic analysis.

3 Structural analysis on Bangcle

3.1 Packing

Bangcle is a packing tool that provides anti-reverse engineering functions such as anti-debugging [27], anti-tampering, anti-decompilation, and anti-runtime injection for mobile code using execution code compression [28]. To examine the functions provided by this tool, we examine the packing process for a sample app that has a simple log-in function shown in Fig. 2. The areas colored in gray in the illustration denote files that have been newly added or changed by Bangcle.
Fig. 2

Structure of an APK file packed by Bangcle

First, using just classes.dex from the original APK file, another classes.jar in the APK file format is generated. Compressing this (unpacked) classes.jar file, the file is generated under the same file name (packed) classes.jar. Then, this classes.jar file is renamed to bangcle_classes.jar and saved in the packed APK file’s assets folder. Additionally, files such as which provide decompression and anti-analysis functions for the bangcle_classes.jar file are also stored together in the assets folder. The list of added files is shown in Table 1.
Table 1

List of files added by Bangcle
















After packing the original classes.dex, a separate classes.dex file is newly generated and added to the packed APK. In addition, the AndroidManifest.xml file is also updated with information regarding the newly generated classes.dex file. Table 2 shows the class information included in the newly generated classes.dex file. The ACall class manages the interface with library files, and the ApplicationWrapper class monitors the control flow using the entry point of the compressed app. The FirstApplication class and MyClassLoader class are used to load the original app into memory. The Util class carries out overhead operations needed to execute and calls functions from to perform unpacking, anti-debugging, anti-tampering, and anti-runtime injection functions.
Table 2

Classes added and used by Bangcle




Interfacing with libraries


Entry point of the packed app


Loading the original app


Loading the original app


Other utilities

3.2 Unpacking

Figure 3 examines the primary logic of the code inserted by Bangcle to execute the packed APK. This code is the Java code obtained by disassembling the Util class.
Fig. 3

Source code decompiled from Util classes

The operation process of the primary methods is as follows. First, the checkX86 method identifies whether the CPU of the device running the app is x86-based or ARM-based. If it is an x86-based CPU, the libsecexe.x86 file is copied to a temporary folder, whereas if it is an ARM-based CPU, the file is copied to a temporary folder. CopyBinaryFile takes the bangcle_classes.jar file in the assets folder of the compressed APK file, copies it to the temporary folder /data/data/[package_name]/.cache/, and renames it as classes.jar (Fig. 4). As a method that provides anti-debugging-related functions, createChildProcess is explained in more detail in the next section. tryDo restores the (packed) classes.jar file copied to the temporary folder into the (unpacked) classes.jar file that includes the original classes.dex. runPkg loads the original classes.dex in the (unpacked) classes.jar file into memory and executes it. After the original classes.dex has been loaded, the (unpacked) classes.jar file is recompressed into the (packed) classes.jar and saved in the temporary folder.1
Fig. 4

Copying procedure when the CopyBinaryFile method is invoked

3.3 Anti-debugging

The method createChildProcess generates a child process, so that Java debug wire protocol (JDWP) and a native debugger cannot run. As shown in Fig. 5, first, the file copied to the temporary folder is loaded into memory. After the file is loaded into memory, the method used to prevent native and/or managed code debuggers is applied.
Fig. 5

Processing steps of the createChildProcess method

Both Figs. 6 and 7 show that the app instantly terminates as soon as connection of the NetBeans and IDA debuggers to the packed APK is attempted.
Fig. 6

Target app process is terminated when being attached to NetBeans

Fig. 7

Target app process is terminated when being attached to IDA

In this way, because the anti-debugging function is already applied with Bangcle, analysis methods that use existing debuggers do not work, and a different method must be used for analysis.

3.4 Code extraction

As explained in Section 3.2, when the packed APK is executed, the bangcle_classes.jar file is renamed to classes.jar and copied to the temporary folder along with files such as The classes.jar saved in the temporary folder at this time is packed, so we cannot analyze it. However, as shown in Fig. 8, if we find the point when the (packed) classes.jar file is temporarily restored to the (unpacked) classes.jar and copy that file to the data folder, we can extract the original classes.dex.
Fig. 8

Modified unpacking procedure for extracting the original classes.dex

Figure 9 shows a section of modified to copy the (unpacked) classes.jar file into the data folder, namely, if the copyFile method is added in order to copy the file between the tryDo method and runPkg method, we can procure the (unpacked) classes.jar with the original classes.dex included.
Fig. 9

Modified code to extract the original classes.dex

If the classes.dex file obtained in this way is converted into smali code using the baksmali tool, we can observe the code in its original state as in Fig. 10. Thus, we see that Bangcle’s packing function can be neutralized in this manner.
Fig. 10

Smali code disassembled from the extracted classes.dex

4 Structural analysis on DexProtector

4.1 Encryption

DexProtector is a program used for anti-reverse engineering for Androids. The main functions provided by DexProtector are class encryption, tamper detection, code and data hiding, etc. In this paper, we set out to examine the potential for reverse engineering analysis focusing on the class encryption function in the various DexProtector functions. Figure 11 shows the class encryption process of DexProtector.
Fig. 11

Class encryption procedure of DexProtector

First, the classes.dex of the original APK file is encrypted to generate the identically named (encrypted) classes.dex and save it in the assets folder. During this time, both the classes.dex file for decrypting and executing the (encrypted) classes.dex file and the AndroidManifest.xml file updated with the modified file information are saved, and the encrypted APK file is generated.

4.2 Decryption

When the encrypted APK file is executed, the (loader) classes.dex file is executed first. The (loader) classes.dex file generates the decryptor APK file in the /data/data/[package_name]/.cache folder, and, using the generated decryptor APK file, the decryptor is run. The executed decryptor decrypts the (encrypted) classes.dex file saved in the assets folder of the encrypted APK file and saves the original APK file in the /data/data/[package_name]/.cache folder. Afterwards, the restored original APK file is actually executed. After being executed, the original APK file saved in the /data/data/[package_name]/.cache folder is deleted. Figure 12 shows the DexProtector class decryption procedure.
Fig. 12

DexProtector class decryption procedure

4.3 Code extraction

Because apps with DexProtector have the anti-debugging function applied by default, debugging at the smali code level can be done using IDA. Therefore, to debug an app at the smali code level, the debuggable property in the AndroidManifest.xml file must be forcibly modified to true, as shown in Fig. 13.
Fig. 13

Modifying AndroidManifest.xml for enabling debugger attachment

In this paper, the objective is to obtain the decrypted classes by reverse engineering the encrypted classes. If the APK is simply repackaged and executed, the original app is terminated before MainActivity is executed and the log is outputted, as seen in Fig. 14. By analyzing the log file, we confirmed that the first generated new.apk file was loaded properly and the second generated new.apk file failed to open because it was not in a zip file format.
Fig. 14

Log output when running the repackaged app

In the case of normal execution, the new.apk file is generated twice and then loaded. However, when the application is executed normally, the new.apk cannot be found because the new.apk file is deleted after loading. Therefore, to incapacitate DexProtector’s class encryption scheme, the new.apk file which is generated in real time must be obtained before deletion.

To open the new.apk file, we must first set a breakpoint for the Application class that is executed for the first time the app is executed by using the smali code level debugger. Then, we set breakpoints such as the dvmJarFileOpen function from by using native code-level debugger. Afterwards, when the app is rerun, after a new.apk file is generated, the app freezes at the assigned breakpoint. If we obtain the first generated new.apk file and decompile it using the JEB decompiler, we can observe the unpack function, etc., as in Fig. 15. The unpack function uses the application’s hash value as a decryption key to decrypt the packed classes.dex. Because hash values change when the application is repackaged, the second new.apk is not generated correctly. Thus, to obtain the second new.apk file (without repackaging), one must connect the debugger and obtain the file before MainActivity is executed.
Fig. 15

Java code decompiled from the first new.apk file

Because Android apps are generated initially from the early Zygote process, we go about attempting to debug during the Zygote process. Using the follow-fork-mode child option in the debugger, we debug the child process generated by Zygote.

The dvmJarFileOpen function [29] is immediately called to load the file type compressed by the functions in the library file (see Fig. 16). The dvmJarFileOpen function that is called first is a function for loading the installed APK file. The dvmJarFileOpen function that is called second is a function for loading the first new.apk file generated. The dvmJarFileOpen function called afterwards is a function for loading the second new.apk file, which includes the decrypted logic.
Fig. 16

Debugging process to obtain the second new.apk file

Figure 17 shows the result of obtaining and disassembling the second new.apk file generated in the installed app’s data folder before the last dvmJarFileOpen function is called. Because the encrypted class was already decrypted, hereafter, there are no constraints on disassembling and conducting reverse analysis. Figure 18 shows one of methods to obtain the original code from DexProtector.
Fig. 17

Smali code disassembled from the second new.apk file

Fig. 18

Process used to obtain the original class from the APK file with class encryption

5 Experiments

In this section, we describe experimental results for determining whether code extraction schemes can be used successfully for analyzing malware samples that apply Bangcle and DexProtector.

5.1 Target app selection

We first obtained the target malware apps for the experiment from Contagio [30] and VirusShare [31] and distinguished them according to whether the apps applied Bangcle or DexProtector.

First, in the case of determining Bangcle, when decompiling the APK file, if package names such as com.secapk.wrapper, com.secneo.guard, and com.bangc-le.protect are included or if,, bangcle_classes.jar, etc. are found in the assets folder, Bangcle was determined to have been applied. In the case of DexProtector, because it is difficult to determine its use with only the results generated from decompiling the file, the Application class is included. It was determined that DexProtector is applied based on the log record showing whether, when executed, the DexOpt process optimizes an identical named apk file twice.

Based on the above criteria, we were able to determine seven malware apps that applied Bangcle and one malware app that applied DexProtector, thus selecting a total of eight apps as the subjects for our experiment.

5.2 Experimental setup

To extract code from malware that applied Bangcle and DexProtector, we experimented in the environment described as follows. Because an app using Bangcle only needs to be repackaged to be executed, we ran the app on an Android version 4.4.4 device that had not been rooted. We determined that the Bangcle version information was given by the numbers assigned with the VERSION_NAME variables in the Util class. Because a debugger needs to be used for apps that have applied DexProtector, we used a rooted device to obtain higher privileges than the app process. For the debugger, we used a GDB built for ARM use. Finally, for decompiling and repackaging, we used apktool version 2.0.3.

5.3 Experimental results

The analyzed apps were applied with various versions of Bangcle, from 1.0 to 8.5.12. However, all of the versions were able to extract the original codes. Likewise, it was possible to extract the original codes from DexProtector.

Table 3 shows the experimental results on packed and unpacked applications using well-known analysis engines. In the case of the packed applications, most of the analysis engines recognize that Bangcle has been used but do not check their behaviors in details. On the other hand, most of them are able to figure out the unpacked application’s behavior and thus determine it is an adware.
Table 3

The analysis results on packed and unpacked applications with various analysis engines

Analysis engine

Packed application

Unpacked application








Android.SecApk.A (PUP)

Android.Dowgin.AM (AdWare)


Secapk.E potentially unsafe

AdDisplay.Dowgin.Rpotentially unwanted








not-a-virus:HEUR: AdWare.AndroidOS.Mmaro.a










Android Dowgin (PUA)

Also, we observed that the unpacked applications include various library related to advertisement as shown in Fig. 19. Therefore, we can understand the exact behavior of the applications by obtaining unseen information from the unpacked applications.
Fig. 19

Advertisement libraries included in the application

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we present the experimental results of a reverse engineering analysis conducted regarding code-hiding methods applied in Android-based malware. As code-hiding tools in the experiment, we used Bangcle, the most commonly used packer in the Android market, and DexProtector, the highest-performing binary code protector, as subjects. Through structural analysis, we were able to identify characteristics and fundamentals of the shielding method for each tool and were successful in extracting the original code that causes malicious behavior from all of the tested malicious apps. We predict that such an analysis method will be used as a foundational technique to quickly detect and counteract mobile malware, which is the core security risk factor in the proliferation of IoT service.

It should be noted that, if the shielding methods analyzed in this paper are conversely used to protect code in normal apps, they could be used to act on the apps’ weaknesses. Therefore, further investigation is required on secure code-hiding methods to prevent such reverse engineering.

7 Endnote

1 Note that we speculate that the reason for recompression after loading the original classes.dex is to prevent reverse engineering analysis of the folder saved in the temporary folder.



This research was supported by the Global Research Laboratory (GRL) program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning (NRF-2014K1A1A2043029).

Competing interests

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

Authors’ Affiliations

Department of Software, Soongsil University


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